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Statistical Evidence with Some Applications
Luai Al-Labadi∗, Zeynep Baskurt†and Michael Evans‡
Abstract : The features of a logically sound approach to a theory of statistical
reasoning are discussed. A particular approach that satisfies these criteria is re-
viewed. This is seen to involve selection of a model, model checking, elicitation
of a prior, checking the prior for bias, checking for prior-data conflict and esti-
mation and hypothesis assessment inferences based on a measure of evidence.
A long-standing anomalous example is resolved by this approach to inference
and an application is made to a practical problem of considerable importance
which, among other novel aspects of the analysis, involves the development of
a relevant elicitation algorithm.
Key words and phrases : foundations of statistical reasoning, model checking,
elicitation of priors, checking priors for bias, checking for prior-data conflict,
measuring statistical evidence, relative belief inferences.
1 Introduction
It is relevant to ask what characteristics should be required of a theory of sta-
tistical reasoning. The phrase statistical reasoning is used here, as opposed to
statistical inference, because there is a logical separation between how the ingre-
dients to a statistical problem are chosen and checked for their validity, and the
inference step which involves the application of the rules of a theory of inference
to the ingredients. So it is argued in Section 2 that there are two aspects to
a theory of statistical reasoning: (i) specifying methodology for choosing and
checking the ingredients to a statistical analysis beyond the data and (ii) spec-
ifying a theory of inference using these ingredients that is based on a measure
of statistical evidence. These components correspond to the premises and the
argument in logical reasoning.
In Section 3 a specific theory of statistical reasoning, as described in Evans
(2015), that satisfies the criteria developed in Section 2 is reviewed. It is shown
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that an application of the theory of relative belief inference resolves difficulties
in a problem that has led to anomalous results for other theories. The overall
aim of the paper is to argue in favor of this approach to statistical reasoning
based on its logical coherence and its utility in applications.
In Section 4 the theory of statistical reasoning is applied to an important
practical problem where some inferential difficulties have arisen, namely, the
problem of determining whether or not there is a relationship between a binary-
valued response variable and predictors. For this, response y ∈ {0, 1} is related
to k quantitative predictors x = (x1, . . . , xk) via y ∼ Bernoulli(p(x)) with
p(x) = G(β1x1 + · · ·+ βkxk) (1)
where G is a known cdf and β = (β1, . . . , βk) ∈ R
k is unknown. This can be
regarded as a case-study for the overall approach and a number of novel results
are obtained. Perhaps the biggest challenge with this model is determining a
suitable prior and in Section 4.1 an elicitation algorithm is developed that im-
proves on earlier efforts. The bias in the prior is measured in Section 4.2. Model
checking is essential, namely, determining if (1) holds at least approximately.
Since this is dealt with in Al-Labadi, Baskurt and Evans (2017), that approach
is used here without much discussion. The check for prior-data conflict is de-
veloped in Section 4.3, together with an approach to modifying the prior when
necessary, and relative belief inferences are applied in Section 4.4.
2 The Foundations of Statistical Reasoning
When concerned with the foundations of statistics it is reasonable to ask: what
is the purpose of statistics as a subject or what is its role in science? To answer
this, consider a context where an investigator has interest in some quantity
and either wants to know (E) the value of this quantity or has a theory that
leads to a specific value for the quantity and so wants to know (H) if this
value is indeed correct and so test the theory. In addition, the investigator
has available data d, produced in some fashion, which it is believed contains
evidence concerning answers to (E) and (H). The purpose of statistical theory
is to provide a reasoning process that can be applied to d to determine what
the evidence has to say about (E) or (H), namely, produce an estimate of the
quantity based on the evidence or assess whether there is evidence either in favor
of or against the hypothesized value. Also, as is widely recognized, estimation
and hypothesis assessment should also produce a measure of the accuracy of
the estimate and a measure of the strength of the evidence for or against the
hypothesis. Answering (E) and/or (H) is called statistical inference and a sound,
logical theory of statistical inference, that contained the minimal ingredients
possible, can be viewed as a major goal of the subject.
Any theory that does not lead to specific answers to (E) and (H) or is
dependent on ingredients or rules of reasoning that are not well-justified, is
unsatisfactory. In the end, the believability of the inferences drawn is entirely
dependent on the soundness of the theory which produced them. So statistics
2
is not an empirical subject like physics, where conclusions can also be assessed
against the empirical world, but is more like an extension of purely logical
reasoning to contexts where the data does not lead to categorical answers to
(E) and (H) and so produces uncertainty. The view is taken here that we want
to maintain a close relationship between a theory of statistical reasoning and the
theory of logical reasoning. This has a number of consequences with perhaps
the most important being that it implies a separation of the assessment of the
appropriateness of the ingredients specified to a statistical analysis beyond the
data, and the theory producing the inferences. The ingredients play the role of
the premises and the theory of statistical inference takes the role of the rules of
inference used in a logical argument. The separation of these aspects of a logical
argument has been understood since Aristotle, see Kneale and Kneale (1962).
There are two main theses of the argument developed here (i) all ingredients
to a statistical analysis must be checkable against the data and (ii) the theory
of inference must be based on a measure of statistical evidence. The rationale
for (i) and (ii) are now considered with (ii) discussed first, as it plays a key role.
The concept of the evidence in the data is clearly of utmost importance to
statistical reasoning. There is no need, however, to provide a measure of the
total evidence contained in the data. For the measure of evidence only has to
deal with (E) and (H) for the quantity of interest. The measure of evidence
must clearly indicate whether there is evidence for or against any specific value
of the quantity of interest being the true value. This follows from the desired
relationship with logic, as the rules of logical inference assume the truth of the
premises, so the theory of statistical inference has to be based on the truth of
the ingredients and this implies that one of the possible values for the quantity
of interest is true. A theory of logical reasoning that could only determine falsity
and never truth is not useful and similarly any valid measure of evidence must
be able to indicate evidence in favor as well evidence against.
Once a measure of statistical evidence is determined, an estimate of the quan-
tity of interest is necessarily the value that maximizes the measure of evidence
and the accuracy of the estimate can be assessed by looking at the size of the set
of values that have evidence in their favor. The measure of evidence similarly
necessarily determines whether there is evidence for or against a hypothesized
value and the strength of this evidence can be assessed by comparison with the
evidence associated with the other possible values for the quantity of interest.
Consider now requirement (i). If a satisfactory measure of evidence could
be determined from the data alone, then this would be ideal, but currently this
is not available and it is questionable whether it is even possible. It is assumed
hereafter that the data x ∈ X can be regarded as having been produced by some
probability distribution on the set X with unknown density f. If the data was
collected via random sampling, then this assumption seems justified, but it is
always an assumption. The density f is unknown and it assumed that once f is
known, then this determines answers to (E) and ((H). The ingredients are then
as follows: it is assumed that f ∈ {fθ : θ ∈ Θ}, a collection of densities on X
indexed by the parameter θ ∈ Θ called the statistical model, and it is assumed
that there is a probability measure Π with density π on Θ that represents
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beliefs of the investigator about the true value of θ ∈ Θ and called the prior.
The ingredients correspond to the premises of a logical argument and these may
be true or false.
It can be questioned as to whether both the model and prior are necessary
for the development of a satisfactory theory and certainly minimizing the ingre-
dients is desirable. But as discussed in Section 3 it seems that a valid definition
of a measure of evidence requires both and again the challenge is open to develop
a satisfactory measure of evidence that uses fewer ingredients. In particular, the
use of a prior is often claimed to be inappropriate as it is subjective in nature
and, as the goal of a scientific investigation is to be as objective as possible,
the prior seems contrary to that. It needs to be recognized, however, that all
ingredients to a statistical analysis beyond the data are subjective in nature as
they are chosen by the statistician. As discussed in Section 3.2, it is possible
to check both the model and the prior against the (objective) data to deter-
mine whether or not reasonable choices have been made. Also, it is possible to
check whether or not the chosen ingredients have biased the results so that the
inferences obtained are in fact foregone conclusions, namely, could have been
made without even looking at the data. It is our view that checking for bias and
checking for conflict with the data go a long way towards answering criticisms
concerning the subjectivity inherent in a statistical analysis. Another implica-
tion from (i) is that no ingredient can be added to a statistical analysis unless
it can be checked against the data which rules out the use of loss functions.
It is not clear how the ingredients are to be chosen and guidance needs to
be provided for this. Not much has been written about how the model is to be
chosen but certainly something needs to be said to justify a specific choice as
part of the statistical reasoning argument. Much more has been written about
the selection of the prior and the position is adopted here that it is necessary
to base this on a clearly stated elicitation algorithm, namely, a prescription for
how an expert can translate knowledge into beliefs as expressed via the prior.
In summary, the desiderata for a theory of statistical reasoning include the
following: a methodology for choosing a model, an elicitation algorithm for
selecting a prior, methodology for assessing the bias in the ingredients chosen,
model checking and checking for prior-data conflict procedures and a theory of
inference based upon a measure of statistical evidence.
3 A Theory of Statistical Reasoning
Choosing and checking the ingredients logically comes before inference but it is
convenient to discuss these in reverse order.
3.1 Relative Belief Inferences
Consider now a statistical problem with ingredients the data d, a model {fθ : θ ∈
Θ}, a prior π and interest is in making inference about ψ = Ψ(θ) for Ψ : Θ→ Ψ
where no distinction is made between the function and its range to save notation.
4
Initially, suppose that all the probability distributions are discrete. This isn’t
really a restriction in the discussion, however, as if something works for inference
in the discrete case but does not work in the continuous case, then it is our view
that the concept is not being applied correctly or the mathematical context is
just too general. For us the continuous case is always to be thought of as an
approximation to a fundamentally discrete context, as measurements are always
made to finite accuracy, and the approximation arises via taking limits. Some
additional comments on the continuous case are made subsequently.
As discussed in Section 2, the basic object of inference is the measure of
evidence and what is wanted is a measure of the evidence that any particular
value ψ ∈ Ψ is true. Based on the ingredients specified, there are two probabil-
ities associated with this value, namely, the prior probability πΨ(ψ), as given
here by the marginal prior density evaluated at ψ, and the posterior probability
πΨ(ψ | d), as given here by the marginal posterior density evaluated at ψ. In
certain treatments of inference πΨ(ψ | d) is taken as a measure of the evidence
that ψ is the true value but, for a wide variety of reasons, this is not felt to
be correct and Example 1 provides a specific case where this fails. Also, this
measure suffers from the same basic problem of p-values, namely, there is no
obvious dividing line between evidence for and evidence against. Moreover, it is
to be noted that probabilities measure belief and not evidence. If we start with
a large prior belief in ψ, then unless there is a large amount of data, there will
still be a large posterior belief even if it is false and similarly, if we started with
a small amount of belief. There is agreement, however, to use the principle of
conditional probability to update beliefs after receiving information or data and
this is to be regarded as the first principle of the theory of relative belief.
So how is the evidence that ψ is the true value to be measured? Basic to
this is the principle of evidence: if πΨ(ψ | d) > πΨ(ψ) there is evidence in favor
as belief has increased, if πΨ(ψ | d) < πΨ(ψ) there is evidence against as belief
has decreased and if πΨ(ψ | d) = πΨ(ψ) there is no evidence either way. This
principle has a long history in the philosophical literature concerning evidence
and a nice discussion can be found in Salmon (1973). This principle doesn’t
provide a specific measure of evidence but at least it indicates clearly when
there is evidence for or against, independent of the size of initial beliefs, and
it does suggest that any reasonable measure of the evidence depends on the
difference, in some sense, between πΨ(ψ) and πΨ(ψ | d), namely, evidence is
measured by change in belief rather than belief. A number of measures of this
change have been proposed, see Evans (2015) for a discussion, but by far the
simplest and the one that has the nicest properties is the relative belief ratio
RBΨ(ψ | d) = πΨ(ψ | d)/πΨ(ψ). (2)
So ifRBΨ(ψ | d) > (<,=)1 there is evidence for (against, neither) for ψ being the
true value. The use of the relative belief ratio to measure the evidence is the third
and final principle of the theory, what we call the principle of relative belief. The
relative belief ratio can also be written as RBΨ(ψ | d) = m(d |ψ)/m(d) where m
is the prior predictive density of the data and m(· |ψ) is the conditional prior
predictive density of the data given Ψ(θ) = ψ.
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Another natural candidate for a measure of evidence is the Bayes factor
BFΨ(ψ | d) as this satisfies the principle of evidence, namely, BF (ψ | d) > (<
,=)1 when there is evidence for (against, neither) ψ being the true value. The
Bayes factor can be defined in terms of the relative belief ratio as BFΨ(ψ | d) =
RBΨ(ψ | d)/RBΨ({ψ}
c | d) but not conversely. Note that the relative belief ratio
of a set A ⊂ Ψ is RBΨ(A | d) = ΠΨ(A | d)/ΠΨ(A) where ΠΨ,ΠΨ(· | d) are the
prior and posterior probability measures of Ψ, respectively. It might appear
that BFΨ(ψ | d) is a comparison between the evidence for ψ being true with
the evidence for ψ being false but it is provable that RBΨ(A | d) > 1 implies
RBΨ(A
c | d) < 1 and conversely, so this is not the case. Also, as subsequently
discussed, in the continuous case it is natural to take BFΨ(ψ | d) = RBΨ(ψ | d).
The principle of relative belief leads to an ordering of the possible values for ψ
as ψ1 is preferred to ψ2 whenever RBΨ(ψ1 | d) > RBΨ(ψ2 | d) since there is more
evidence for ψ1 than ψ2.When Ψ(θ) = θ this agrees with the likelihood ordering
but likelihood fails to provide such an ordering for general ψ. It is common to
use the profile likelihood ordering even though this is not a likelihood ordering
and this doesn’t agree with the relative belief ordering. It is noteworthy that
the relative belief idea is consistent in the sense that inferences for all ψ = Ψ(θ)
are based on a measure of the change in prior to posterior probabilities.
The relative belief ordering leads immediately to a theory of estimation. For
basing inferences on the evidence requires that the relative belief estimate be a
value ψ(d) maximizes RBΨ(ψ | d) and typically this value is unique so ψ(d) =
arg supψ∈ΨRBΨ(ψ | d). It is also necessary to say something about the accuracy
of this estimate in an application. For this a set of values containing ψ(d) is
quoted and the “size” of the set is taken as the measure of accuracy. Again
following the ordering based on the evidence, it is necessary that the set take
the form {ψ : RBΨ(ψ | d) > c} for some constant c ≤ supψ∈ΨRBΨ(ψ | d) since, if
RBΨ(ψ1 | d) ≤ RBΨ(ψ2 | d), then ψ2 must be included whenever ψ1 is. But what
c should be used? It is perhaps natural to chose c so that {ψ : RBΨ(ψ | d) > c}
contains some prescribed amount of posterior probability, so the set is a γ-
credible region. But there are several problems with this approach. For what γ
should be chosen? Even if one is content with some particular γ, say γ = 0.95,
there is the problem that the set may contain values ψ with RBΨ(ψ | d) < 1
and such a value has been ruled out since there is evidence against such a ψ
being true. It is argued in Evans (2015) that the plausibility set PlΨ(d) =
{ψ : RBΨ(ψ | d) > 1} be used as PlΨ(d) contains all the values for which there
is evidence in favor of it being the true value. In general circumstances, it is
provable that RBΨ(ψ(d) | d) > 1 so PlΨ(x) 6= φ. There are several possible
measures of size but certainly the posterior content ΠΨ(PlΨ(d) | d) is one as this
measures the belief that the true value is in PlΨ(d), but also some measure such
as length or cardinality is relevant. If PlΨ(d) is small and ΠΨ(PlΨ(d) | d) large,
then ψ(d) can be judged to be an accurate estimate of ψ.
It is immediate that RBΨ(ψ0 | d) is the evidence concerning H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0.
The evidential ordering implies that the smaller RBΨ(ψ0 | d) is than 1, the
stronger is the evidence against H0 and the bigger it is than 1, the stronger is
the evidence in favor H0. But how is one to measure this strength? In Baskurt
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and Evans (2013) it is proposed to measure the strength of the evidence via
ΠΨ (RBΨ(ψ | d) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 | d) | d) (3)
which is the posterior probability that the true value of ψ has evidence no greater
than that obtained for the hypothesized value ψ0. When RBΨ(ψ0 | d) < 1 and
(3) is small, then there is strong evidence against H0 since there is a large
posterior probability that the true value of ψ has a larger relative belief ratio.
Similarly, if RBΨ(ψ0 | d) > 1 and (3) is large, then there is strong evidence that
the true value of ψ is given by ψ0 since there is a large posterior probability
that the true value is in {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 | d)} and ψ0 maximizes the
evidence in this set. Additional results concerning RBΨ(ψ0 | d) as a measure of
evidence and (3) can be found in Baskurt and Evans (2013) and Evans (2015).
For continuous parameters it is natural to define RBΨ(ψ | d) = limǫ→0RBΨ(
Nǫ(ψ) | d)where Nǫ(ψ) is a sequence of sets converging nicely to {ψ} as ǫ → 0.
When the densities are continuous at ψ, then this limit equals (2) so this is a
measure of evidence in general circumstances. Also, it is natural to define the
Bayes factor by BFΨ(ψ | d) = limǫ→0BFΨ(Nǫ(ψ) | d) and, when the densities
are continuous at ψ, then BFΨ(ψ | d) = RBΨ(ψ | d).
A variety of consistency results, as the amount of data increases, are proved
in Evans (2015) concerning the estimation and hypothesis assessment proce-
dures. In particular, when H0 is false, then (2) converges to 0 as does (3).
When H0 is true, then (2) converges to its largest possible value (greater than
1 and often ∞) and, in the discrete case (3) converges to 1. In the continu-
ous case, however, when H0 is true, then (3) typically converges to a U(0, 1)
random variable. This simply reflects the approximate nature of the inferences
and is easily resolved by requiring that a deviation δ > 0 be specified such that
if dist(ψ1, ψ2) < δ, where dist is some measure of distance determined by the
application, then this difference is to be regarded as immaterial. This leads to re-
defining H0 as H0 = {ψ : dist(ψ, ψ0) < δ} and typically a natural discretization
of Ψ exists with H0 as one of its elements. With this modification (3) converges
to 1 as the amount of data increases when H0 is true. Given that data is always
measured to finite accuracy, the value of a typical continuous-valued parameter
can only be known to a certain finite accuracy no matter how much data is
collected. So such a δ always exists and it is part of an application to determine
the relevant value, see Example 7 here, Al-Labadi, Baskurt and Evans (2017)
and Evans, Guttman and Li (2017) for developments on determining δ.
It is immediate that relative belief inferences have some excellent properties.
For example, any 1-1 increasing function of RBΨ(· | d), such as logRBΨ(· | d),
can be used to measure evidence as the inferences are invariant to this choice.
Also, RBΨ(· | d) is invariant under smooth reparameterizations and so all relative
belief inferences possess this invariance property. For example, MAP (maximum
a posteriori) inferences are not invariant and this leads to considerable doubt
about their validity, see also Example 1. In Evans (2015) results from a num-
ber of papers are summarized establishing optimality results for relative belief
inferences in the collection of all Bayesian inferences. For example, Al-Labadi
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and Evans (2017) establish that relative belief inferences for ψ have optimal
robustness to the prior πΨ properties. Also, as discussed in Section 3.2, since
the inferences are based on a measure of evidence a key criticism of Bayesian
methodology can be addressed, namely, the extent to which the inferences are
biased can be measured.
Relative belief prediction inferences for future data are naturally produced
by using the ratio of the posterior to prior predictive densities for the quantity
in question. The following example illustrates this and demonstrates significant
advantages for relative belief.
Example 1. Prediction for Bernoulli sampling.
Consider an example discussed in Chapter 6 of Diaconis and Skyrms (2018).
A tack is flipped with x = 1 indicating the tack finishes point up and x = 0
otherwise, so x ∼ Bernoulli(θ). Suppose the prior is θ ∼ U(0, 1) and the goal
is to predict f future observations (y1, . . . , yf ) having observed n independent
tosses (x1, . . . , xn). The posterior of θ is beta(nx¯ + 1, n(1 − x¯) + 1), the prior
predictive density of (x1, . . . , xn) is mn(x1, . . . , xn) = 1/(n + 1)
(
n
nx¯
)
and the
posterior predictive density for (y1, . . . , yf ) is
mn,f ((y1, . . . , yf ) | (x1, . . . , xn)) =
(n+ 1)
(
n
nx¯
)
(n+ f + 1)
( n+f
(n+f)[ nn+f x¯+
f
n+f
y¯]
) , (4)
which is constant for all (y1, . . . , yf ) with the same value of y¯. Maximizing
(4) gives the MAP predictor of (y1, . . . , yf ). If nx¯/(n + f) > 1/2, then the
maximum occurs at (y1, . . . , yf) with y¯ = 1, namely, (y1, . . . , yf) = (1, . . . , 1). If
nx¯/(n+f) < 1/2, then the maximum occurs at (y1, . . . , yf) with y¯ = 0, namely,
(y1, . . . , yf) = (0, . . . , 0). If nx¯/(n+ f) = 1/2, then a maximum occurs at both
(y1, . . . , yf) = (0, . . . , 0) and (y1, . . . , yf ) = (1, . . . , 1). So using MAP gives the
absurd result that (y1, . . . , yf) is always predicted to be either all 0’s or all 1’s.
Clearly there is a problem here with using MAP.
Now suppose (x1, . . . , xn) = (0, . . . , 0) so the prediction is all 0’s and
mn,f ((y1, . . . , yf ) | (0, . . . , 0)) = (n+ 1)/(n+ f + 1)
(
n+ f
f y¯
)
.
For fixed f, then mn,f ((y1, . . . , yf ) | (0, . . . , 0)) → 0 as n → ∞ whenever y¯ 6= 0
and converges to 1 when y¯ = 0. Diaconis and Skyrms (2018) note, however,
that when f = n, then mn,n((0, . . . , 0) | (0, . . . , 0)) → 1/2 as n → ∞ and make
the comment “If this is an unwelcome surprise, then perhaps the uniform prior
is suspect.” They also refer to some attempts to modify the prior to avoid
this phenomenon which clearly violates an essential component of the Bayesian
approach. In our view there is nothing wrong with the uniform prior, rather
the problem lies with using posterior probabilities implicitly as measures of
evidence, both to determine the predictor and to assess its reliability.
The relative belief ratio for (y1, . . . , yf ) is
RB((y1, . . . , yf ) | (x1, . . . , xn)) =
(n+ 1)
(
n
nx¯
)
(f + 1)
(
f
fy¯
)
(n+ f + 1)
( n+f
(n+f)[ nn+f x¯+
f
n+f
y¯]
) . (5)
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Figure 1: Plot of the relative belief ratio when n = 20, nx¯ = 6 in Example 1.
With n = f = 20 and nx¯ = 6, Figure 1 gives the plot of (5) as a function of ny¯.
The best relative belief predictor of (y1, . . . , yf) is any sample with f y¯ = 6 and
Pln(x1, . . . , xn) = {(y1, . . . , yf ) : f y¯ = 2, 3, . . . , 10} has posterior content 0.893.
So there is reasonable belief that the plausibility set contains the “true” future
sample but certainly there are many such samples. By contrast with MAP, a
sensible prediction is made using relative belief.
For the case when f = n and (x1, . . . , xn) = (0, . . . , 0), then
RB((y1, . . . , yn) | (0, . . . , 0)) =
(n+ 1)2
(2n+ 1)
(
n
ny¯
)
(
2n
ny¯
) = (n+ 1)2
(2n+ 1)
∏n−1
i=0
{
2− y¯ − i/n
(2− i/n)
}
which is decreasing in y¯ and so is maximized for the sample with y¯ = 0. Similarly,
when x¯ = 1 the predictor is the sample with y¯ = 1. So, at the extremes, the
predictions based on MAP and relative belief are the same but otherwise there
is a sharp disagreement. Also,
Pln(0, . . . , 0) = {(y1, . . . , yn) : RB((y1, . . . , yn) | (0, . . . , 0)) > 1}
always contains (y1, . . . , yn) = (0, . . . , 0) and for any c ∈ (0, 1] such that y¯ ≥ c,
RB((y1, . . . , yn) | (0, . . . , 0)) = {(n+ 1)
2/(2n+ 1)}
∏n−1
j=0 (1− y¯/(2− j/n))
≤ {(n+ 1)2/(2n+ 1)} (1− c/2)
n
→ 0
as n→∞. Therefore, for any c ∈ (0, 1], there is an N, such that for all n > N,
then Pln(0, . . . , 0) contains no (y1, . . . , yn) having a proportion of 1’s that is c or
greater. So Pln(0, . . . , 0) is shrinking as n increases in the sense that it contains
only samples with smaller and smaller proportion of 1’s as n increases.
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The posterior content of the plausibility region equals
∑
{ny¯:RB((y1,...,yn) | (0,...,0))>1}
mn,f ((y1, . . . , yf ) | (0, . . . , 0))
(
n
ny¯
)
(6)
which equals the sum over all the summands that are greater than 1/(n+1) and
mn,f ((y1, . . . , yf ) | (0, . . . , 0))
(
n
ny¯
)
=
(n+ 1)
(2n+ 1)
∏n−1
i=0
{
2− y¯ − i/n
(2 − i/n)
}
=
(n+ 1)
(2n+ 1)


1 y¯ = 0
1
2 y¯ =
1
n
1
2
1−1/n
2−1/n y¯ =
2
n
...
...
1
2
1−1/n
2−1/n · · ·
1−(k−1)/n
2−(k−1)/n y¯ =
k
n
...
...
.
When y¯ = k/n the corresponding term converges to (1/2)k+1. Thus for all n
large enough, the sum (6) contains the terms for y¯ = 0, 1/n, . . . , k/n. Therefore,
for ǫ > 0 and all n large enough, (6) is greater than (1/2)[1+1/2+· · ·+(1/2)k]−
ǫ = 1− (1/2)k+1 − ǫ and the posterior content of Pln(0, . . . , 0) converges to 1.
So relative belief also behaves appropriately when f = n and x¯ = 0 while
MAP does not. The failure of MAP might be attributed to the requirement
that the entire sample (y1, . . . , yn) be predicted. If instead it was required only
to predict the value ny¯, then the prior predictive of this quantity is uniform on
{0, 1, . . . , f}, the posterior of ny¯ equals RB((y1, . . . , yf) | (x1, . . . , xn))/(f + 1)
and the relative belief ratio for ny¯ equals RB((y1, . . . , yf ) | (x1, . . . , xn)). So,
as is often the case when the quantity in question has a uniform prior, MAP
and relative belief estimates are the same. But even in this case there is no
natural cut-off for MAP inferences to say when there is evidence for or against
a particular value. The fact that it is necessary to modify the problem in
this way to get a reasonable inference is, in our view, a substantial failing of
MAP. It seems reasonable to suggest that when an inference approach is shown
to perform poorly on such examples, that it not be generally recommended.
Additional examples of poor performance of MAP are discussed in Evans (2015).
3.2 Choosing and Checking the Ingredients
The first choice that must be made is the model and there are a number of
standard models used in practice. There isn’t a lot written about this step,
however, and yet it is perhaps the most important step in solving a statistical
problem. It is generally accepted that the correct way to choose a prior is
through elicitation. This means that a methodology is prescribed that directs
an expert in the application area on how to translate their knowledge into a
prior. There are various default priors in use that avoid this elicitation step,
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but it is far better to recommend that sufficient time and energy be allocated
for the elicitation of a proper prior. Staying within the context of probability
suggests that a variety of paradoxes and illogicalities are avoided.
Given the ingredients, the relative belief inferences may be applied correctly
but it is still reasonable to ask if these ingredients are appropriate for the partic-
ular application. If not, then the inferences drawn cannot be considered valid.
There are at least two questions about the ingredients that need to be answered,
namely, is there bias inherent in the choice of ingredients and are the ingredients
contradicted by the data?
The concern for bias is best understood in terms of assessing the hypothesis
H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0. LetM(· |ψ) denote the prior predictive distribution of the data
given that Ψ(θ) = ψ. Bias against H0 means that the ingredients are such that,
with high probability, evidence will not be obtained in favor of H0 even when
it is true. Bias against is thus measured by
M(RBΨ(ψ0 |D) ≤ 1 |ψ0). (7)
If (7) is large, then obtaining evidence against H0 seems like a foregone con-
clusion. For bias in favor of H0 consider M(RBΨ(ψ0 |D) ≥ 1 |ψ∗) where
dist(ψ∗, ψ0) = δ, so ψ∗ is a value that just differs from the hypothesized value
by a meaningful amount. Bias in favor of H0 is then measured by
sup
ψ∗∈{ψ: dist(ψ,ψ0)=δ}
M(RBΨ(ψ0 |D) ≥ 1 |ψ∗). (8)
If (8) is large, then obtaining evidence in favor of H0 seems like a foregone con-
clusion. Typically M(RBΨ(ψ0 |D) ≥ 1 |ψ∗) increases as dist(ψ∗, ψ0) increases
so (8) is an appropriate measure of bias in favor of H0. The choice of the prior
can be used somewhat to control bias but typically a prior that makes one bias
lower just results in making the other bias higher. It is established in Evans
(2105) that, under quite general circumstances, both biases converge to 0 as the
amount of data increases. So bias can be controlled by design a priori.
The model needs to be checked against the data. For if the data d lies in the
tails of every distribution in the model, then this suggests model failure. There
are a wide variety of approaches to assessing this and these are not reviewed
here. One general comment is that at this time there do not seem to exist general
methodologies for modifying a model when model failure is encountered.
The prior can also be checked for conflict with the data. A conflict means
that the observed data is in the tails of all those distributions in the model
where the prior primarily places its mass. For a minimal sufficient statistic T
for the model, Evans and Moshonov (2006) used the tail probability
MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (t)) (9)
to assess prior-data conflict where (9) small indicates prior-data conflict. In
Evans and Jang (2011a) it is shown that, under general circumstances, (9)
converges to Π(π(θ) ≤ π(θtrue)) as the amount of data increases. There are a
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x2 No. of animals No. of deaths
−0.86 5 0
−0.30 5 1
−0.05 5 3
0.73 5 5
Table 1: Data in Example 1.
variety of refinements of (9) that allow for looking at particular components of
a prior to isolate where a problem with the prior may be. In Evans and Jang
(2011b) a method is developed for replacing a prior when a prior-data conflict
has been detected. This does not mean simply replacing a prior by one that is
more diffuse, however, as is demonstrated in Section 4.1.
4 Binary-valued Response Regression Models
The following example, based on real data, is used to illustrate each aspect of
the approach to statistical reasoning recommended here.
Example 2. Bioassay experiment.
Table 1 gives the results of exposing animals to various levels in g/ml of
a dosage of a toxin, where x2 is the log-dosage and the number of deaths
is recorded at each dosage, see Racine, Grieve, Fluhler and Smith (1986).
The dosages range from e−0.86 = 0.423 to e0.73 = 2.075 g/ml. The logis-
tic regression model p(x1, x2) = G(β1 + β2x2) is considered for this data, so
x1 ≡ 1, G(z) = e
z/(1 + ez), (β1, β2) ∈ R
2 and p(1, x2) is the probability of
death at dosage x2. The counts T = (t1, t2, t3, t4) at the dosages comprise a
minimal sufficient statistic for this problem with observed value (0, 1, 3, 5). The
conditional distribution of T given (β1, β2) is a product of binomials.
In Al-Labadai, Baskurt and Evans (2017) a goodness-of-fit test based on this
data was applied for this model using a uniform prior on the space [0, 1]4 of all
probabilities. Relative belief was used to assess the hypothesis that the model
is correct and overwhelming evidence in favor of this model was obtained and
so model correctness is assumed here. One goal is the estimation of (β1, β2)
and another is the assessment of the hypothesis H0 : β2 = 0. Acceptance of H0
implies that there is no relationship between the response and the predictor.
4.1 Eliciting the Prior
Elicitation of a prior can be difficult when the interpretation of the parameters
is unclear. For example, with the model (1) it is not clear what the βi represent
in contrast to linear models where they represent either location parameters
or rates of change with respect to predictors. This leads to attempts to put
default priors on these quantities and there are problems with this approach.
For example, suppose p(1, x) = G(β1 + β2x), where G is the standard logistic
cdf and the prior is given by the βi being i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
0) where σ
2
0 is chosen large
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Figure 2: Prior density of of p(1, x) = G(β1 + β2x), G is the standard logistic
cdf, β1, β2 ∼ N(0, 20
2) and x = 1.
to reflect little information about these values. In Figure 2 we have plotted the
prior this induces on p(1, 1) when σ = 20. This reflects the fact that as σ grows
all the prior probability for p(1, x) piles up at 0 and 1 and so this is clearly a
poor choice and it is certainly not noninformative.
The strange behavior of diffuse normal priors has been noted by others.
Bedrick, Christensen and Johnson (1996, 1997), based on Tsutukawa and Lin
(1986), make the recommendation that priors should instead be placed on
the p(xi), as these are parameters for which there is typically prior informa-
tion. Their recommendation is that, k of the xi values be selected and then
beta(α1i, α2i) priors be placed on the corresponding p(xi) via eliciting prior
quantiles. This results in more sensible priors but depends on the choice of the
observed predictors and it is unclear what kind of priors this induces on the βi.
Following Bedrick, Christensen and Johnson (1996, 1997) priors here are
elicited for the probabilities but the approach is different. First, it is not re-
quired that the elicitation be carried out at observed values of the predictors.
Rather, it is supposed that there is a set of linearly independent predictor vec-
tors w1, . . . ,wk where bounds can be placed on the probabilities in the sense
that l(wi) ≤ p(wi) ≤ u(wi) for i = 1, . . . , k with virtual certainty. By virtual
certainty it is meant that for prior probability measure Π, then
Π(l(wi) ≤ p(wi) ≤ u(wi) for i = 1, . . . , k) ≥ γ, (10)
where γ is chosen to be close to 1. For example, γ = 0.99 certainly seems
satisfactory for many applications but a higher or lower standard can be cho-
sen. The motivation for this is that typically information will be available for
the probabilities such as it is known that p(wi) is very small (or very large) or
almost certainly that p(wi) is in some specific range. Of course, for some of
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the wi virtually nothing may be known about p(wi) and in that case taking
[l(wi), u(wi)] = [0, 1] is appropriate. One implication of this is that when the
choice is made [l(wi), u(wi)] = [0, 1] for every i, then the elicitation procedure
should lead to a Π that is at least approximately uniform on the probabili-
ties. The approach to elicitation, via stating bounds on parameter values that
hold with virtual certainty, has been successfully employed in Cao, Evans and
Guttman (2015) to determine a prior for the multivariate normal model, and in
Evans, Guttman and Li (2017) to determine a prior for the multinomial model.
Another reason for allowing the elicitation procedure to be independent of
the observed xi is that prior beliefs about p(xi) may apply equally well about
p(xj) for some j simply because xi and xj are close and then it seems that
the correlation between the beliefs should be part of the prior. Modelling such
correlations is harder and hopefully can be avoided by choosing the wi care-
fully. For example, requiring the wi to be mutually orthogonal seems like an
appropriate way of achieving independence in many contexts.
The second way in which our approach differs from previous developments
is that Π is restricted to the family of multivariate normal priors on β as this
allows us to see directly how (10) translates into information about β. For note
that (10) is equivalent to
Π(G−1(l(wi)) ≤ G
−1(p(wi)) ≤ G
−1(u(wi)) for i = 1, . . . , k)
= Π(G−1(l(wi)) ≤ w
′
iβ ≤ G
−1(u(wi)) for i = 1, . . . , k)
= Π(G−1(l(W)) ≤Wβ ≤ G−1(u(W))) ≥ γ (11)
where W = (w1 . . .wk)
′ ∈ Rk×k, l(W) = (l(w1), . . . , l(wk))
′ ∈ Rk, u(W) =
(u(w1), . . . , u(wk))
′ ∈ Rk. So, ifWβ ∼N(µ0,Σ0), then β ∼Nk(W
−1
µ0,W
−1Σ0
(W−1)′) and it is clear what this says about β.
The task then is to determine (µ0,Σ0) so that (11) is satisfied. A natural
choice for µ0 is to put µ0 = G
−1(c(W)) where c(W) = (l(W)+u(W))/2 is the
centroid of the k-cell [l(W), u(W)]. For example, when [l(W), u(W)] = [0, 1]k,
then c(W) = 1k/2, where 1k is the k-dimensional vectors of ones, which implies
µ0 = 0. Other choices for µ0 can be made if there are good reasons for this.
Given that the wi have been chosen so that prior beliefs about the prob-
abilities p(wi) are independent, this implies that the coordinates of Wβ are
independent and so Σ0 =diag(σ
2
1, . . . , σ
2
k) for some choice of the prior variances
σ2i . There are, however, typically many choices satisfying (11). For example,
taking σ2i = 0 for all i achieves this but clearly this choice does not reflect what
is actually known about the probabilities. As might be expected, the choice of
the σ2i is critical and dependent on G. Furthermore, as Figure 1 demonstrates,
an injudicious choice results in absurdities.
Since G−1(u(wi)) − µ0i > 0 and G
−1(l(wi)) − µ0i < 0, both these values
are infinite iff [l(wi), u(wi)] = [0, 1] and so no information is being introduced
via the prior. In such a case a uniform[0, 1] prior on the probability results
and the appropriate normal distribution is determined by approximating the
distribution function G by a normal cdf, see Examples 3, 4 and 5. Suppose then
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that at least one of G−1(u(wi)) and G
−1(l(wi)) is finite and so σi satisfies
Φ
(
G−1(u(wi))− µ0i
σi
)
− Φ
(
G−1(l(wi))− µ0i
σi
)
≥ γ1/k, (12)
as then independence ensures that (11) is satisfied. When both G−1(u(wi))
and G−1(l(wi)) are finite, the left side of (12) has the value 1 when σi = 0, is
strictly decreasing to the value 0 as σi → ∞ and so there are always values of
σi ≥ 0 satisfying (12). When both G
−1(u(wi)) and G
−1(l(wi)) are finite there
is a unique largest solution to (12), which is the preferred solution as it best
represents the prior information, and it is easily found numerically by bisection.
If u(wi) = 1 and l(wi) ∈ (0, 1), then σi = (G
−1(l(wi)) − µ0i)/Φ
−1(1 − γ1/k)
is the solution provided γ > (1/2)k which is a very weak requirement as recall
that γ represents virtual certainty. If u(wi) ∈ (0, 1) and l(wi) = 0, then σi =
(G−1(u(wi))− µ0i)/Φ
−1(γ1/k) is the solution again provided γ > (1/2)k.
The following examples consider the situation l(wi)) = 0, u(wi) = 1. In this
case µ0i = 0 and G
−1(p(wi)) will be distributed with cdf G when p(wi) ∼
U(0, 1). Generally this leads to a need to approximate G by a normal cdf to
obtain a normal prior although no approximation is required in Example 3.
Example 3. Probit regression.
Here G = Φ and so G−1(p(wi)) ∼ N(0, 1) when p(wi) ∼ U(0, 1). As such
σi = 1 and the standard normal distribution on G
−1(p(wi)) corresponds to no
information about p(wi). When there is no information about any of the p(wi),
then β ∼Nk(0,W
−1(W−1)′) which equals the Nk(0, I) distribution whenever
W is an orthogonal matrix. In general, however a lack of information about the
probabilities leads to a prior on β that is dependent on W, namely, dependent
on the values of predictor variables corresponding to the probabilities.
Example 4. Logistic regression.
In this case G is the standard logistic cdf and so w′iβ =G
−1(p(wi)) is dis-
tributed standard logistic when p(wi) ∼ U(0, 1).A well-knownN(0, λ
2) approxi-
mation to the standard logistic distribution, as discussed in Camilli (1994), leads
to normal priors that are much easier to work with. The optimal choice of λ, in
the sense that it minimizes maxx∈R1 |Φ(x/λ)−e
x/(1+ex)| is given by λ = 1.702
and this leads to a maximum difference less than 0.009. Clearly this error will
generally be irrelevant when considering priors for the probabilities in a logistic
regression problem. So when w′iβ ∼ N(0, 1.702
2) then p(wi) is approximately
distributed U(0, 1) with the same maximum error. Figure 3 contains plots of
the density of p = ez/(1 + ez) when z ∼ N(0, λ2) for various choices of λ and
it is indeed approximately uniform when λ = 1.702. Using normal probabilities
rather than logistic probabilities leads to relatively small differences, so it seems
reasonable to use a normal prior on β in a logistic regression.
Example 5. t regression.
Suppose that G is taken to be the cdf of t with υ degrees of freedom. Table
2 presents the optimal choice of λ for a N(0, λ2) approximation to the t(υ) cdf
together with the maximum error. There does not appear to be much difference
in using tυ probabilities instead of normal ones unless υ is quite low.
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Figure 3: Plots of the density of p = ez/(1+ ez) when z ∼ N(0, d2) and λ = 0.5
(–), λ = 1.0 (- -), and λ = −1.702 (...).
υ 30 20 10 5 2 1
λ 1.022 1.034 1.069 1.144 1.407 1.980
max error 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.031 0.058
Table 2: Optimal choice of a N(0, λ2) distribution to approximate a t(ν) distri-
bution.
Consider now an application of the elicitation algorithm.
Example 6. Bioassay experiment (Example 2 continued).
In this example k = 2. To determine the prior it is necessary to choose
W = (w1 w2) ∈ R
2×2 and [l(W), u(W)]. The authors are not experts in bioas-
say but, given the range of dosages applied in the experiment, it is reasonable to
suppose that an expert might be willing to put bounds on the probabilities that
hold with prior probability γ = 0.99 when x2 = −0.50 and x2 = 0.50 leading to
W =
(
1 −1/2
1 1/2
)
.
Let us suppose that an expert believes with virtual certainty that the true
probabilities lie in the intervals [0.15, 0.75], when x2 = −0.50, and in [0.25, 0.95],
when x2 = 0.50. So the centroid of the 2-cell [0.15, 0.75]× [0.25, 0.95] is given by
(0.45, 0.60) and since G−1(p) = log(p/(1−p)) for logistic regression, this implies
µ0 = (G
−1(0.45), G−1(0.60)) = (−0.20, 0.41). Also, [G−1(0.15), G−1(0.75] =
[−1.735, 1.099] and [G−1(0.25), G−1(0.95)] = [−1.099, 2.944] so, using (12), the
largest values of σ1 and σ2 satisfying Φ (1.299/σ1)− Φ (−1.535/σ1) ≥ (0.99)
1/2
and Φ (2.534/σ2) − Φ (−1.509/σ2) ≥ (0.99)
1/2
are given by σ1 = 0.490 and
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Figure 4: Density histograms of p(1,−0.8) (left) and p(1, 0.8) (right) based on
a sample of 105 from the elicited prior in Example 6.
σ2 = 0.580. Therefore the prior on β is
β ∼ N2(W
−1(−0.20, 0.41)′,W−1diag(0.4902, 0.5802)(W=1)′)
= N2
((
0.105
0.610
)
,
(
0.144 0.048
0.048 0.577
))
. (13)
Figure 4 contains histograms of large samples from the priors on two extreme
probabilities. The shape of the prior is similar for other values of x2.
4.2 Measuring the Bias in a Prior
Consider applying the approach discussed in Section 3.2 to measuring bias in
the prior derived in Section 4.1 for the bioassay example.
Example 7. Bioassay experiment (Example 2 continued).
Consider whether or not there is bias induced by the prior in Example
6 with respect to the hypothesis H0 : β2 = 0. It is necessary to compute
MT (RB2(0 |T ) ≤ 1 |β2 = 0), to measure bias against, and supβ2∈{−δ,δ}MT (RB2
(0 |T ) ≥ 1 |β2), to measure bias in favor, where RB2(· |T ) is the relative belief
ratio function for β2 based on data T and δ > 0 is such that if |β2| < δ, then
practically speaking H0 is considered true. To determine δ, the more general
problem of what changes in both β1 and β2 are deemed irrelevant is considered.
Given the settings used in this experiment, it seems reasonable to consider x2 as
restricted to the interval [−1, 1]. Then, whenever |β1−β
′
1| < δ and |β2−β
′
2| < δ,
the difference in log odds satisfies |β1 + β2x2 − (β
′
1 + β
′
2x2)| ≤ 2δ which implies
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that ratio of the odds lies in (e−2δ, e2δ) which for small δ is approximately equal
to (1 − 2δ, 1 + 2δ). This in turn implies that the difference in the probabilities
is less than 2δ. In this example we take δ = 0.01.
Now RB(β1, β2 |T ) = {
∏4
i=1
(
5
ti
)
pti(1, x2i)(1− p(1, x2i))
5−ti}/mT (T ) where
mT (T ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∏4
i=1
(
5
ti
)
pti(1, x2i)(1 − p(1, x2i))
5−ti}π(β) dβ.
The relative belief ratio for β2 is RB2(β2 |T ) =
∫∞
−∞RB(β1, β2 |T )π1(β1 |β2) dβ1
= mT (T |β2)/mT (T ) where π1(· |β2) is the conditional prior density of β1 given
β2 which (13) implies is the N(0.105 + 0.083(β2 − 0.610), 0.140) distribution.
For given T = (t1, t2, t3, t4), the numerator and denominator in RB2(0 |T )
can be estimated via simulation but to calculate the biases we need to do
this for many T. Consider the calculation of MT (RB2(0 |T ) ≤ 1 |β2 = 0)
via the following algorithm and note that there are only 64 = 1296 values of
(t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}
4.
Algorithm
(i) simultaneously estimate the values mT (t1, t2, t3, t4) for each (t1, t2, t3, t4) via
a large sample from (13) and store these in a table,
(ii) simultaneously estimate the values mT (t1, t2, t3, t4 |β2 = 0) for each (t1, t2,
t3, t4) via a large sample from π1(· | 0) and store these in a table,
(iii) using the values in these two tables estimate RB2(0 |T ) for all values of T
and then estimateMT (RB2(0 |T ) ≤ 1 |β2 = 0) by summing themT (t1, t2, t3, t4 |
β2 = 0) for those (t1, t2, t3, t4) for which RB2(0 |T ) ≤ 1.
The bias in favor can be estimated at ±δ in exactly the same way but in step (ii)
replace π1(· | 0) by π1(· | − δ) and by π1(· | δ). These computations were carried
out and resulted in the bias against equaling 0.22 and the bias in favor equaling
0.77 at −δ and 0.78 at δ. So there is some bias against H0 with this prior but
there is appreciable bias in favor of H0, at least when interest is in detecting
deviations of size δ = 0.01. For β2 = 5, however, the bias in favor of H0 is 0.006,
so there is in reality no bias in favor for large values of this parameter. One
could contemplate modifying the prior to reduce the bias in favor at δ = 0.01,
but typically this just results in trading bias in favor with bias against. The
real cure for excessive bias of either variety, is to collect more data.
In general problems the approach to the computations used here will not
be feasible and so alternative methods are required. In certain examples some
aspects of the computations can be done exactly but, in general, approximations
such as those discussed in Nott et al. (2016) will be necessary.
4.3 Checking and Modifying a Prior
Consider now checking the prior derived in Section 4.1 for the bioassay example.
Example 8. Bioassay experiment (Example 2 continued).
The tail probability for checking the prior is given by
MT (mT (t1, t2, t3, t4) ≤ mT (0, 1, 3, 5)). (14)
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As part of the algorithm discussed in Section 4.2, the values of mT (t1, t2, t3, t4)
have been estimated and the proportion of values ofmT (t1, t2, t3, t4) that satisfy
the inequality gives the estimate of (14). In this example (14) equals 0.41 so
there is no prior-data conflict.
If prior-data conflict exists, the methods discussed in Evans and Jang (2011a)
are available to obtain a more weakly informative prior. In this case it is nec-
essary to be careful as it has been shown in Section 4.1 that simply increasing
the variance of the prior will not necessarily accomplish this. On the other
hand there is the satisfying result that the N2(0, 1.702
2I2) prior, where I2 is the
identity matrix, will avoid prior-data conflict, so modifying the elicited prior to
be closer to this prior is the appropriate thing to do when a conflict exists.
4.4 Inferences
Now consider estimation and hypothesis assessment for the bioassay example.
Example 9. Bioassay experiment (Example 2 continued).
Consider first the assessment of the hypothesis H0 : β2 = 0. From the
algorithm the quantity RB2(0 | (0, 1, 3, 5)) is available and this indicates whether
there is evidence in favor of or against H0. In this case RB2(0 | (0, 1, 3, 5)) =
0.021 so there is evidence against H0. A calculation described below gives the
value 0.001 for the strength, so it seems there is strong evidence against H0.
To obtain the joint relative belief estimate of (β1, β2) it is necessary to max-
imize RB(β1, β2 |T ) as a function of (β1, β2) which is the same as the MLE.
The plausibility region for this estimate is then {(β1, β2) : RB(β1, β2 |T ) > 1}
and the size and posterior content of this set provide a measure of the accuracy
with which the coordinates of β can be simultaneously known. But it is worth
noting that the i-th coordinate of this joint estimate is not necessarily the value
that has the greatest evidence in its favor, rather this is obtained by maximizing
RBi(βi |T ) as a function of βi with plausibility region {βi : RBi(βi |D) > 1}. So
the evidence approach dictates that βi be estimated by maximizing RBi(βi |T ).
In problems where components of a multidimensional parameter are related by
some constraint, then it is clearly necessary to estimate the components simul-
taneously, but that is not the case here.
The value of RBi(βi |T ) needs to be estimated and, since this cannot be
done for every value of βi, its value is estimated on a finite grid. For this
let [Li, Ui] be the effective prior support for βi, say containing 0.995 of the
probability, and form the grid Gi = {Li, Li+ δ, Li+2δ, . . . , Ui− δ, Ui}. For each
β1 ∈ G1 estimate mT ((0, 1, 3, 5) |β1) using a large sample from π2(· |β1) which
gives RB1(β1 | (0, 1, 3, 5)) = mT ((0, 1, 3, 5) |β1)/mT ((0, 1, 3, 5)). It is then easy
to obtain the relative belief estimate β1(0, 1, 3, 5) and plausibility region {β1 :
RB1(β1 | (0, 1, 3, 5)) > 1}. The true relative belief estimate will differ from this
estimate by at most δ but this difference has been deemed irrelevant. A similar
procedure is carried out for β2 but now sampling from π1(· |β2) to estimate
mT ((0, 1, 3, 5) |β2). The posterior density for βi satisfies πi(βi | (0, 1, 3, 5)) =
RBi(βi | (0, 1, 3, 5))πi(βi) and since RBi(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)) has been computed on the
grids, these values can be used to approximate the contents of the plausibility
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Figure 5: A plot of RB1(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)) over the effective support of the prior in
Example 9.
regions via an obvious quadrature. Similarly, the strengths can be estimated
and the strength quoted above equals
∑
β2∈S
π2(β2 | (0, 1, 3, 5))δ where S =
G2 ∩ {β2 : RB2(β2 | (0, 1, 3, 5)) ≤ RB2(0 | (0, 1, 3, 5))}.
Implementing this for β1, the estimate β1(0, 1, 3, 5) = 0.11 was obtained with
plausibility region [−0.21, 0.49] having posterior content 0.35. So the range of
plausible values for β1 is not large but there is not a high belief that the true
value is in this interval. Figure 5 is a plot of RB1(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)).
An interesting phenomenon occurs when considering the estimation of β2.
In Figure 6 the left panel plots RB2(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)) over the effective support
of the marginal prior π2 for β2. From this it is clear that the relative belief
estimate of β2 lies outside this range. Recall, however, that the chosen prior
passed the check for prior-data conflict. The check for prior-data conflict only
tells us, however, that the observed data is consistent with at least some of the
probabilities determined by where the prior places its mass. The right panel of
Figure 6 is a plot of RB2(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)) over a much wider range. Note too that
there is an important robustness property as shown in Al-Labadi and Evans
(2017) for RB2(· | (0, 1, 3, 5)) as it is only weakly dependent on π2. In this case
π2 does not place mass where it appears it should but there is not enough data
to detect the conflict. The relative belief estimate of β2 is β2(0, 1, 3, 5) = 7.31
and the plausibility region for β2 is [1.14, 30.48] with posterior content 0.83. As
such, there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the true value of β2.
As long as it is possible to sample from the posterior for a 1-dimensional
parameter, then the computations necessary for the inferences for such a pa-
rameter are feasible. As such, the Gibbs sampling algorithm of Albert and
Chib (1993) is particularly relevant although it is not needed in Example 9.
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Figure 6: Plot of RB2(· | (0, 1, 3, 5) over the effective support of the prior (left
panel) and over a full range of possible values (right panel) in Example 9.
The harder computations are those involving the various prior predictives but
these do not need to be highly accurate as even one decimal place will indicate
whether there is bias or prior-data conflict.
5 Conclusions
Criteria for a satisfactory theory of statistical reasoning have been developed.
Perhaps more should be required, but it seems that those stated are necessary.
A particular approach has been outlined that satisfies these criteria. An exam-
ple has shown that this approach can resolve anomalies/paradoxes that arise via
a commonly used methodology. Many other such instances of resolving infer-
ential difficulties as well as results establishing optimal performance, have been
documented in Evans (2015). An application of the approach to the problem of
binary-valued response regression has been carried out and it has been shown
to lead to a number of novel insights into such problems.
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